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Abstract
The rise in digitalization has sparked the Fourth Industrial Revolution, raising new concerns and
deep divisions throughout the European Union (EU). While the adoption of the Digital Single
Market Strategy on May 6, 2015 attempted to adapt to the increasingly digital world, it further
highlighted differences among Member States. This paper argues that cross-national variations in
digital trade restrictiveness can be explained by the number of cyber-attacks a Member state
experiences. This study differs from existing explanations in that it takes a technological
perspective and attempts to explain a digital question with a digital phenomenon. The paper tests
this hypothesis through a combination of anecdotal and quantitative evidence. Anecdotal evidence
regarding the evolution of cyber-attacks in France in Germany suggests that both countries
responded to cyber-attacks with strict national legislation towards digital issues. A simple linear
regression of the number of cyber-attacks on a country’s Digital Trade Restrictiveness assesses the
magnitude of the relationship between these variables for a sample of 28 EU Member States. While
the data suggests a causal relationship between the two variables, further research is required to
provide a more complete explanation for the variation in question.
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Introduction
The Fourth Industrial Revolution – motivated by rapid technological change and
digitalization – has already had a strong impact on global trade, economic growth and social
progress. Cross-national e-commerce has generated trillions of dollars in economic activity in
recent years and continues to accelerate. The ability of data to move across borders supports new
business models, boosting global GDP by 10% in the last decade alone. It has facilitated the use
of blockchain technology, thereby increasing efficiency and transparency in international trade
(World Economic Forum 2018). However, digital trade barriers, including outdated regulations,
fragmented governance and strict data localization policies, could potentially prevent these gains
from fully materializing. At the same time, policy-makers must balance societal concerns in the
digital commercial space while stakeholders need to navigate different divergent national
responses.
Today, many of the existing global trade rules do not reflect this new reality and are not
easily transferred to the digital era. New technologies and business models raise new governance
questions and challenges. In the absence of global rules, governments move unilaterally to
regulate their domestic markets. The risk of fragmentation materializes, which increases the
barriers for large and especially small companies to operate internationally. The emergence of
digital trade barriers has resulted in fragmented and inconsistent approaches to the digital sector
which inherently limits progress towards the completion of the Digital Single Market.
The importance of digital trade and the need to secure free cross border flow of data,
create rules on e-commerce and address data privacy issues are widely recognized. In the “Trade
for All” Communication of October 2015, the European Commission refers to the digital
revolution, describing digital trade as an offensive interest for the European Union (EU), creating
many opportunities for companies including small-to-medium enterprises (SME) and consumers.
A digital trade strategy will reinforce this position further (Business Europe 2017). It is due to
this limitless potential which emerges through a freely interconnected world that divergences
among EU Member States become increasingly relevant. Without consensus on the issue, the EU
will lag behind powerful countries such as the United States (U.S.) and China. In addition, as
Europe’s population continues to age, the prevalence of the digital world becomes more
apparent. The digital revolution provides not only increased labor opportunity in European
countries but also an increased potential for jobs to be performed remotely, a characteristic
highly compatible with an aging population. Therefore, variations among Member States creates
inconsistencies and require a critical examination in order to prevent economic damage.
This paper seeks to explain cross-national variations in the levels of digital trade
restrictiveness. This paper proposes that cyber-security attacks can explain variations among
Member States levels of digital trade restrictiveness. Digital trade restrictiveness can be defined
as, the level of which a country is open or closed to participating in digital trade practices (DTRI
2018). I hypothesize that if a country has a higher number of cyber-attacks, then a Member
state’s digital trade policies will be more restrictive.
This analysis uses two case studies which exemplify the trend the original hypothesis put
forward. A simple linear regression was conducted using data on a country’s number of cyberattacks in the year 2018 and the Digital Trade Restrictiveness scores from the 2018 Digital Trade
Restrictiveness Index. The paper proceeds as follows: section two provides a background on the
evolution of cybersecurity, the digital single market and the digital single market strategy.
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Section three gives an overview of the existing literature on this topic. Section four explains the
divergences which is followed by a case study analysis for two Member States. Section five
provides a methodology outlining the process of the conducted study followed by a results
section. The conclusion summarizes the findings and makes suggestions for further research.

Background
The Digital Single Market
Before delving into the literature, it is important to provide a definition of the Digital
Single Market (DSM) to provide context for the research question being analyzed. According to
the European Commission, The Digital Single Market is a policy belonging to the European
Single Market that covers digital marketing, e-commerce and telecommunications. The DSM is
part of the Digital Agenda for Europe 2020 program of the EU, an initiative of Europe 2020
proposed strategy. It is defined by a Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe by the European
Commission (2015).
The Digital Single Market Strategy
Citizens and businesses of the EU have often faced barriers when using online tools and
services. These barriers mean that consumers have restricted access to some goods and services,
businesses cannot reap all benefits from digitalization and governments and citizens cannot fully
benefit from this digital transformation. The DSM Strategy was adopted on May 6, 2015 and is
comprised of three policy pillars: improving access to digital goods and services, creating an
environment where digital networks and services can prosper and using digitalization as a driver
for growth (Cousiel 2019).
The Evolution of Cybersecurity
The evolution of cybersecurity in the EU is important when evaluating its relationship to
the digital trade sector. By examining supranational responses to cybersecurity issues, the
disparities in national policies become more visible. The term cyber and its associated terms
cyberspace and cybersecurity have drifted from the world of the arts and into the mainstream. A
cyber-attack is a deliberate exploitation of computer systems, technology-dependent enterprises
and networks. Cyber-attacks use malicious code to alter computer code, logic or data, resulting
in disruptive consequences that can compromise data and lead to cybercrimes, such as
information and identity theft (European Network and Information Security Agency 2015). As
technology has continued to advance, cybersecurity concerns have become increasingly
prevalent for the EU. On October 18, 2018, the European Council called for measures to build
strong cybersecurity in the EU. EU leaders referred in particular to restrictive measures able to
respond to and deter cyber-attacks.
An important EU response to the cybercrime phenomenon is the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). This data protection regulation consists of 11 chapters broken down into 99
articles covering the rights of data subjects (people rising in the territory of the EU); the
responsibilities of the controllers and processors of data; transfers of personal data to third
countries or international organizations; the actions of independent supervisory authorities and
the applications of remedies, liabilities and penalties (European Commission 2016). The
regulation clarifies what constitutes personal data. This includes name, address, localization,
online identifier, health, income information, cultural profile and other personal characteristics.
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(See Figure 1.) Under GDPR, all citizens residing in an EU country have a right to access their
personal information and also secure the right to erasure, commonly known as “the right to be
forgotten” (E-Trade 2018).
The current literature suggests alternative explanations for the factors that influence
variations in digital trade restrictiveness. These explanations include The Digital Divide,
National Sovereignty and Digital Endowments. The following brief review of these explanations
shows that there is a gap in research concerning the role of cybersecurity issues in relation to
digital trade policies.

Literature Review
A significant portion of the research on this subject suggests socio-economic and
accessibility factors as the primary reasoning for variations across countries. Commonly referred
to as the Digital Divide, this concept emphasizes access to fundamental information technologies
– most often telephone and internet access. Wong, a professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Policy, evaluates the divide in Asian countries based on penetration levels of telephone
main lines, PCs, and Internet use. In 2001, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) defined the term ‘Digital Divide’ as “the gap between individuals,
households, businesses and geographic areas at different socioeconomic levels with regard to
both their opportunities to access information and communication technologies (ICT) and to their
use of the internet for a wide variety for activities” (2002). The Digital Divide has two main
aspects: the first gap considers mainly the division between those who have access to ICT such
as computers and the Internet and those who do not. This type of scope often refers to the urbanrural divide, the latter having lower internet speeds, prices and technological choices. The second
gap refers to different types and levels of internet use, motivation and skills: looking at what
uses, and benefits people enjoy, once they have access to the internet (Negreiro 2015).
Many developments have already been made which have further exaggerated the Digital
Divide. The U.S. and a number of leading digital nations are backed by the vast lobbying power
of Silicon Valley and big business. On the other side, a number of emerging and developing
countries are looking to resist new rules that they perceive as adding extra burden on them, with
vague benefits. The introduction of the “Digital Trade Agenda” during the Obama
administration, allowed for this resistance to surface. This agenda was adopted by the TransPacific Partnership (TPP). Many of the less developed countries believe the rules outlined in the
agenda will widen the digital divide that already exists between the developed and developing
world, by exposing local digital firms to fierce competition. As the history of trade rules has
shown, rapidly opening developing economies up to foreign competition can potentially hollow
them out. In addition, some countries argue that they need to adopt more active policy to develop
their own digital economies, which they fear global rules could limit (The University of
Manchester 2019).
The alternate explanation identified within this strand of the literature considers the
ability or inability of citizens in a certain country to access technology as well as the fear of
exploitation in developing countries. While this socio-economic perspective highlights further
issues concerning the digital sector within the EU, it has an inherent focus on the individual
rather than the state as a whole.
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The National Sovereignty argument says that the prioritization of maintaining certain
competencies at the national level has a significant effect on a country’s willingness to surrender
their digital abilities. Sovereignty is defined as “the full right and power of a governing body
over itself, without any interference from outside sources or bodies” (Pusterla 2018). In political
theory, sovereignty is a substantive term designating supreme authority over some polity
(Pusterla 2018). The concept of national sovereignty has been utilized to explain divergences in
digital trade restrictiveness. Viviane Reding, a Luxembourg politician and former Member of
European Parliament (MEP), attributes fragmentation to ‘national silos.’ Her sovereignty
concerns surround the idea that digital sovereignty should be held at the European level. She
states,
“Now that we still have the economic power we should use this potential to
determine our own norms. This implies acting together, based on our European
values, anticipating future developments by embracing technology and
innovation and negotiating with our international partners on a legal level playing
field, enabled by a coherent and strong European policy” (2015, 3).

On the opposing side of the sovereignty debate, there are scholars who argue that national
sovereignty is threatened by digitalization and should be avoided. In the book, "Twilight of
Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World." The author, Walter
Wriston, tackles the concept of sovereignty in the “Age of Information.” He states,
“[s]overeignty, the power of a nation to stop others from interfering in its internal affairs, is
rapidly eroding.” Many forces today, such as trade, global capital flows, and environmental
degradation are thought to undermine sovereignty. Wriston argues that the developing
conventional wisdom seems to be that the Internet is contributing to the erosion of sovereignty
and will, perhaps more than any of the other globalization forces, contribute to relegating
sovereignty and its traditional trappings to the other irrelevant aspects of history (Wriston 1998).
The third perspective that emerges is one that discusses the age of digitalization as a tool
to strengthen sovereignty. Perritt argues, that the Internet has the potential to strengthen national
and global governance – thus enhancing sovereignty rather than destroying it. From the
perspective of national governance, the Internet can be harnessed to promote the Rule of Law,
which is critical for good governance of societies all over the world (1998). These opposing
views have contributed to the divergence on the issue of digital trade within the EU. Although
the sovereignty debate introduces polarizing perspectives, there is substantial literature which
suggests the sovereignty issue can explain digital strategy variations.
Similar to the socio-economic theory, digital endowments are another explanation
thought to influence variations in strategy, but this theory focuses on the state as a whole
whereas, socio-economic focuses on the individual. Digital Endowments are introduced as the
third explanatory factor that is thought to have a causal relationship with variations in digital
trade strategies. Members of the EU have different positions on matters of digital openness, and
those differences typically reflect the role of the digital sector in national economies and the
relative size of digital endowments. For instance, countries with smaller digital endowments (e.g.
digital infrastructure like networks) often believe they do not stand to gain as much from
digitalization as countries with larger endowments. Fredrik Erixon Philipp Lamprecht argues that
this is a misconception. He states, “It is crucial to note that economic success in the digital
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economy is actually not merely the absolute level of digital endowments, but rather the way in
which these endowments are effectively employed” (2018).
There is a long history of analysis about why countries tend to be more or less open to
reforms that increase trade and competition. While there is a pattern throughout history that
smaller countries generally are more open than larger countries, it is equally clear that the size of
a country’s “endowments” – in this case, the relative size of digital endowments like digital
infrastructure or digital human capital – informs policy choices. In other words, positions of
openness tend to favor those factors of production that are in abundance and harm production of
factors that are scarce and vice versa (Rogowski 1990).
While this survey of the literature has successfully explored the evolution of
cybersecurity and the suggested explanatory factors that create variations in digital trade
restrictiveness, the connection between the two fails to be adequately represented. The existing
literature explicitly identifies that a digital divide exists and that the threat of cybersecurity is
growing rapidly, but there is no indication that the cybersecurity phenomenon could be
responsible for the divisions and variations among the EU Member States. This paper contributes
to the literature in that it bridges the gap between ambiguous explanations for digital trade
variations and cyber threats. It proposes a new way of explaining the disconnect being
experienced in the digital sector of the EU. In addition, this paper focuses specifically on the EU
Member States and creates the empirical puzzle of why countries who are sufficiently similar in
that they have all successfully acceded into the EU, ultimately have variations among them in a
sector that has largely been regarded as positive and potentially revolutionary. In sum, the
research examined in this review is preliminary and fragmented. While all of the research
concludes that variations exist, the findings have significant vulnerabilities in that they fail to
explain a digital problem with a digital phenomenon.

Divergences
In a political entity like the EU, it is puzzling how countries who are supposed to share
common values yet maintain stark differences are able to cooperate so closely. This is
particularly true for the growing Digital Sector in the EU. At the Tallin Digital Summit in
September 2017, Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker stated,
Cyber-attacks know no borders, but our response capacity differs very much from one
country to the other, creating loopholes where vulnerabilities attract even more attacks.
The EU needs more robust and effective structures to ensure strong cyber resilience and
responses to cyber-attacks. We do not want to be the weakest link in this global threat
(European Commission 2017).

At this point, it is clear after observing the literature that variations among Member States
exist and there have been numerous attempts to explain why these variations exist. By
emphasizing the areas of the digital sector where Member States tend to have significant
divergences, a better understanding of these disparities can be acquired and will assist in the
explanation of cyber-attacks as an explanatory factor.
While the EU has made good efforts to improve the policy conditions for digital goods
and services, the policy fragmentation in Europe and the severity of some of the restrictions in
place create “thick” digital borders. In Europe, the two most digitally restrictive countries are
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France and Germany (DESI 2018). Both countries have more restrictive digital trade policies
than most other developed countries. France is also the only European country that is a part of
the Top Ten most restrictive countries in digital trade worldwide (DTRI 2018). On the other end
of the spectrum, Ireland, Norway, Malta, the Netherlands, Latvia, Luxembourg and Estonia rank
high in digital openness. The restrictive culture of France and Germany is very different from the
digital openness of a country like Ireland. Their restrictive stance has often prevented the EU
from making fast progress to create a DSM. Following Brexit, France and Germany will be the
two dominant EU economies. Their influence in the EU will, therefore grow, which is likely to
make it more difficult to advance the DSM (DTRI 2018).
In terms of where the divergences exist, the most significant factor that has defined these
variations among Member States’ digital strategies is data localization policies. Some countries,
such as Finland have very relaxed data localization policies. According to the Information
Technology and Innovation Foundation, “Finland’s Account Act (1997) requires that a copy of
companies’ accounting records be stored in Finland. Alternatively, the records can be stored in
another EU country if a real time connection to the data is guaranteed” (Cory 2017). Finland is
an example of a country that does not have high restrictions in their digital trade strategy.
However, this does not hold true for the previously mentioned countries, Germany and France.
Germany, along with France, has been at the center of efforts to force companies to store data
only in Europe or even in-country, such as through a “Bundescloud” (a cloud for government
data) in Germany. Belgium, similar to Finland has a less restrictive approach. Belgium’s laws
require accounting and tax documents to be kept in office, agency, branch or other private
premises of the taxpayer where they have been kept, prepared or sent. Companies can apply to
Belgian tax authorities for an exemption to this requirement. These accounting records may be
kept in another place (such as overseas), provided that immediate access to the records can be
granted or that such records can be provided on short notice (Cory 2017).
This presentation of the divergences among Member States shows that even similar
countries in terms of economic development and performance have conflicting strategies when it
concerns digital trade. In addition to this claim, Germany and France have higher percentages of
their populations who experienced cyber-attacks within the past year. By comparison, the
percentage of people in Belgium and Finland who experienced cyber-attacks was much lower
(ENISA 2018). This aligns with the original hypothesis and prompts further testing on the
remaining EU-28.

Examination of the Case Studies
This paper examines two case studies, France and Germany in order to show how their
national digital strategies have evolved as cyber-attacks have become more intricate and
advanced. These two case studies aim to show how increased cyber-attacks within France and
Germany have provoked the formulation of thorough and hard line responses, such as digital
restrictiveness, as a mechanism to limit negative effects felt by cybercrime.

Case Study: France
Digital Policies: Pre-attacks
France adopted a data privacy law in 1978. It applied to public and private organization
and forbids gathering sensitive data about physical persons (sexuality, political or religious
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opinions). The law is administered by the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des
Libertés (CNIL), a dedicated national administration. Since the implementation of this first Data
Protection law, it has been modified twice: in 2004 following the transposition of Directive
95/46 on the protection of personal data and in 2016 following the French digital republic law
(Dreyfus 2018). It is important to observe here that the first Data protection law in France
actually preceded the invention of the Internet in 1983. While there were modifications made
after the implementation of the Data Protection Law, no real or substantial reforms were made in
terms of the digital economy until 2016.
Cyber-Attacks
According to Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, cyber-attacks in France continue to
double in numbers with each passing year and their severities have only worsened (BBC 2017).
In December 2010, attacks began with an email which was sent around the French Ministry of
Finance. The email’s attachment was a “Trojan Horse” type consisting of a PDF document with
embedded malware. Once accessed, the virus infected the computers of some of the
government’s senior officials as well as forwarding the offensive email on to others. The attack
infected approximately 150 of the finance ministry’s 170,000 computers (BBC 2011).
More recently, in 2015, the Paris-based French broadcasting service TV5Monde was
attacked by hackers who used malicious software to attack and destroy the network’s systems
and take all twelve of its channels off the air. Responsibility for the attack was initially claimed
by a group called the “Cyber Caliphate.” However, a more in-depth investigation by French
authorities revealed the attack on the network had links to APT-28, a Russian-affiliated hacker
group (BBC 2016).
APT-28 struck again in May 2017, on the eve of the French presidential election, when
more than 20,000 e-mails belonging to the campaign of Emmanuel Macron were published on an
anonymous file-sharing website (Willsher 2017).
By observing the consecutive and evolving nature of cyber-attacks in France, it can be
concluded that with each new attack, the stakes became higher and the consequences worsened.
Therefore, the amendments to existing policies and the implementation of new policies calling
for increased digital restrictiveness can be seen immediately after these cybercrime events had
taken place.
Examining the Policy Response
On October 7, 2016, the French Digital Republic Act came into force following a year
long process which began in December 2015 to amend the laws regulating various aspects of the
digital economy in France. This law introduced new provisions that regulate the digital economy
as a whole (such as open data, online cooperative economy, revenge porn and access to the
internet). For privacy professionals, this law was important as it introduced several key
amendments under the French Data Protection Act of 1978 and other laws, prior to the GDPR’s
implementation in 2018. The provisions of the Digital Republic Act are broken down into ten
key points. The most significant amendment to the Data Protection Act concerns the French Data
Protection Authority’s (CNIL) power to impose administrative fines. Previously limited to EUR
150,000 under the amended Data Protection Act, the CNIL is now able to impose fines up to
EUR 3 million. The Digital Republic Act explained that once the GDPR came into force in 2018,
the CNIL had the ability to impose administrative fines of up to EUR 20 million or 4% of total
worldwide annual turnover for any data protection violations as defined under article 83 of the
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GDPR. But controllers in France may still be fined up to EUR 3 million for any violation to the
amended Data Protection Act that is outside the scope of the GDPR. This is particularly
significant in relation to the new rights that are granted to the data subjects (Proust & Goossens
2016). Given that we see a massive increase in the amount of cyber-attacks in 2015 and 2016 in
France, the policy responses to the digital economy such as The Digital Republic Act and
modernized data protection laws can be considered timely and strategic rather than coincidental.

Case Study: Germany
Digital Policies: Pre-attacks
In the early 1960s, consideration for comprehensive data protection began in the U.S. and
further developed with advancements in computer technology and its privacy risks. Therefore, a
regulatory framework was needed to counteract the impairment of privacy in the processing of
personal data. Germany was one of the first countries with the strictest and most detailed data
privacy laws in the world. The citizens’ right to protection is stated in the Constitution of
Germany, in Art. 2 para. 1, and Art. 1 para 1. (Deutscher Bundestag 2017). German citizens’
data is mainly protected under the Federal Data Protection Act of 1977 or
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG), which has been amended most recently in 2009. This act
specifically targets all businesses that collect information for their use. The regulation protects
the data within the private and personal sector, and, as a member of the EU, Germany has ratified
its Act, Convention, and additional protocols with the EU according to the EU Data Protection
Directive 95/46 (Wybitul 2017).
Cyber-Attacks
The nature of cyber-attacks in Germany are continuous and far-reaching. The German
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported that critical infrastructure in Germany is
increasingly targeted in cyber-attacks (2018). According to the report, the BSI was alerted to 145
such incidents between July 1, 2017 and May 31, 2018. Most of the attacks were concentrated in
the information technology (IT) and telecommunications sectors, followed by the energy
industry. The BSI also estimated that the number of malware programs increased from 600
million to 800 million during the same period. The report highlighted that government networks
were also in the sights of cyber criminals on a daily basis. The incidents included targeted
campaigns as well as mass attacks, mostly through e-mails containing malware. Between July
2017 and May 2018, 28,000 threatening emails per month were caught in security filters on
average before they could reach the intended inbox.
Because of this growing number of attacks, greater complexity of digital infrastructure
and a larger volume of online data, the BSI stated that the likelihood of successful cybercrime
had also increased. To illustrate the severity of cyberattacks in Germany, one can reference the
hacking of the Bundestag or German Parliament. In May 2015, hackers managed to gain access
to the Bundestag’s internal server, launching an unprecedented attack by using “Trojan viruses.”
A representative of the German Parliament confirmed that data was stolen during the attack. This
event prompted politicians to express their concerns about the Interior Ministry’s ability to
establish functioning cyber defense (The Guardian 2015).
In relation to this attack, more recently the data stolen during the Bundestag hacking was
published online. The hacking leaked sensitive data belonging to hundreds of German
politicians, celebrities and public figures and were published online via a Twitter account. The
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cache of documents included personal phone numbers, addresses, internal party documents,
credit card details and private chats. The hacking affected all of the main German political
parties except the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) (The Guardian 2019).
The examination of cyber-attacks in Germany shows that the political and social
ramifications of cybercrime are not always immediately apparent. While Germany thought they
had effectively responded to the attack, recent developments have proven otherwise.
Examining the Policy Response
The BDSG was amended in 2009 and 2010 with three amendments: Novelle I was a new
regulation of the activities of credit bureaus and their counterparties (especially credit
institutions). The content of Novelle II included changes to the privileges for trading, new
regulations for market and opinion research, opt-in coupling ban, employee data protection,
order data processing, new powers for the supervisory authorities and new or expanded fines,
information obligations in the event of data breaches and dismissal of protection for data
protection officers (DPO). Novelle III was a small sub-item within the law that implemented the
EU Consumer Credit Directive (Wyitbul 2017).
In 2018, Germany saw not only the introduction of GDPR but the new German Privacy
Act (BDSG-new) as well. The BDSG-new complements, specifies and modifies the GDPR. It
provides rules for specific topics, e.g. for data processing in the context of employment, the
designation of a data protection officer, scoring and credit checks as well as profiling (Wyitbul
2017). In this context, it is evident that the restrictive reforms made in German policy were
prompted by the introduction of GDPR. The GDPR was introduced to minimize security
breaches, data protection issues and other instances of cybercrime. The evolution of German
digital policy shows how the consecutive and restrictive policies implemented post-cyber-attacks
can be interpreted as a reaction to the cybersecurity issues being faced at the time.

Methodology
In order to test my hypothesis that the number of cyber-attacks affects digital trade
restrictiveness scores, I collected data from the 2018 DTRI and the 2018 ENISA report and
conducted a simple linear regression. The idea of a digital economy is relatively new, and it was
not until recently that these variations became problematic. We know that participation in the
digital economy and digital trade has positive effects on a nation’s economy, but what remains
unclear is what factors influence a country’s open or restrictive approach to digital trade strategy.
The information collected for this analysis was obtained from two databases that used figures
from the year 2018. By analyzing the variations in the national digital strategies described in the
divergences section, I am able to conclude that these variations are present even among similar
countries. Furthermore, I am able to take this information observed from the divergences and
compare it with the Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index (DTRI) score in order to determine if
their score is consistent with their national strategy. The DTRI also provides me with the ability
to compare this score with that of other countries so that I can assign “high” and “low” scores for
reference. This paper will aim to answer the research question by examining one independent
variable that I believe has a profound effect on a country’s DTRI score. For example, do
countries with high rates of cyber-attacks have higher DTRI scores? More specifically, does an
increased number of cyber-attacks on a country contribute to a more restrictive strategy in terms
of digital trade? This is done by performing a bivariate regression analysis using Microsoft
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Excel. A bivariate regression analysis involves analyzing two variables to determine the strength
of the relationship between them. My goal is to determine whether or not the independent
variable (number of cyber-attacks) impacts a country’s Digital Trade Restrictiveness score
(dependent variable) and to establish a relationship between cyber-attacks and variations among
Member States.
Empirically, I am expecting to see that countries with increased instances of cyberattacks will have higher DTRI scores. I hypothesize this because I expect that countries who are
frequently targets of cyber-attacks are more aware of their vulnerability than other countries that
are not frequent targets. Therefore, the target countries respond and react by implementing
restrictive measures in order to minimize their potential to fall victim to more cybercrimes. The
implementation of these restrictive measures is indicative of a higher DTRI score.
As previously mentioned, the independent or predictor variable is the number of cyberattacks experienced by a specific country. This figure was originally expressed as a percentage
because it represents the percentage of the country’s entire population. I converted this unit into a
decimal for the purpose of expressing both variables in the same unit of analysis. This variable
measures the amount of cyber-attacks in each of the 28 EU Member States (See Figure 2). The
figures used for the total populations of each EU Member state were obtained from The United
Nations Population Division Database from 2018. The data for the independent variable, the
number of cyber-attacks experienced in each Member state, was collected from the 2018 ENISA
report.
The figures for the dependent variable, the DTRI score, were obtained from the 2018
DTRO Report. (See Figure 3.) The DTRI measures how countries in the world restrict digital
trade. The dependent variable was measured using the DTRI score because the variations being
analyzed include an individual country’s openness to digital trade or digital topics relative to
another country/countries. The DTRI score is expressed as a decimal because the scores can vary
between 0 (completely open) and 1 (virtually closed). The average score of the EU-28 is .37
meaning the average EU country is more open than closed. The DTRI is based on a wide
spectrum of digital trade policies covering more than 100 policy measures across 64 countries
worldwide. The Index is the first global initiative to provide transparency of applied digital trade
restrictions and sheds light on how countries compare with each other. The Index is based on the
Digital Trade Estimates (DTE), a database developed by ECIPE.

Results
Model 1 examines the relationship that cyber-attacks have on a country’s DTRI score by
performing a linear regression analysis (See Figure 4). Before conducting this analysis, I
expected to find that a country with increased cyber-attacks would have a DTRI score closer to 1
(virtually closed). Model 1 (See Table 1.) tells us there is a positive relationship between the
number of cyber-attacks a country experiences and their respective digital trade restrictiveness.
For each additional increase in the number of cyber-attacks, the overall DTRI score increased by
0.280. This tells us that when a country’s DTRI score increases, their policies on digital trade
become more restrictive. The r² was 0.113. This indicates that the model accounts for
approximately 11% variance in the dependent variable. Unfortunately, this model was not found
to be statistically significant, meaning that we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This could be a
result of the two variables being endogenous to each other, in that one variable could determine
the other. I conclude that this model is not a good fit for determining what explains the cross11

national variations in digital trade restrictiveness. I believe that this study would have been
different had I included more variables.
Table 1. Effects on Digital Trade Restrictiveness Score
Model 1

n

Cyber
Attacks

0.280
(0.154)

Dependent
Variable

0.324***
(0.029)
27

r2
0.113
*= p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001

Discussion of Findings/Conclusion
Based on the findings in the regression analysis, I can confirm that my original
hypothesis was supported by observing that countries subject to more cyber-attacks have higher
DTRI scores. The differences of the DTRI scores can explain the variations in national strategies
towards digital trade. Although these findings were supportive of my hypothesis, the lack of
statistical significance indicates that further research on this topic is required in order to
determine a more complete cause for variations in strategy.
In this context, it should be acknowledged that there are other variables that serve as
explanatory factors in addition to cyber-attacks. For instance, a country’s levels of digital
integration and cyber-readiness should be included as potential factors. Digital integration should
be considered an explanatory factor because countries with lower digital integration are likely
not as concerned with their digital strategies as countries who have higher digital integration. A
country’s cyber-readiness is determined by a multitude of factors such as, national strategies,
defense and crisis response, incident response, diplomacy and trade, information sharing, Ecrime and law enforcement and cyber R&D (France Cyber Readiness Assessment 2016). Cyber
readiness could potentially assist in the explanations for strategy variations because countries
who are more prepared are likely to be less vulnerable. (See Figure 5.) This theory is exemplified
in the fact that countries with low technological readiness have seemingly high DTRI scores. For
example, countries such as, Indonesia, India, Vietnam and Russia (DTRI 2018).
This study has presented a trend that northern countries have high DTRI scores.
Therefore, another explanation that should be explored is a north-south divide. Although there
may be merit in this argument, the north-south divide should be explored for divisive factors
other than economic development. According to ECIPE, the DTRI is negatively associated with
levels of economic development. The Index clearly shows that higher levels of digital trade
restrictiveness are particularly observable in countries which are economically less developed
(ECIPE 2018).
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The aim of this study was to explain cross-national variations in digital trade
restrictiveness. After reviewing the literature and studying specific cyber-attack events
throughout Europe, it becomes clear that Member States are troubled as to why there is a
negative connotation associated with the word “variation.” The EU has consistently urged for the
completion of the Digital Single Market indicating that they believe these variations are harmful
rather than beneficial. This is based on the fact that the DSM seeks to harmonize digital trade
rules and eliminate diverging national strategies. This analysis has led me to believe that the
word “variation” in the context of the EU is almost always negative due to the rhetoric put forth
by the EU institutions indicating that variations result in fragmentation. However, variations in
national strategies towards digital trade and other digital aspects have given Member States the
ability to address their own national concerns because, as history has shown, there is no “one size
fits all” for every EU government sector.
The case studies presented in this paper have shown how cyber-attacks contain variation
themselves in that the magnitude of attacks differs from country to country. Some Member
States are frequent targets of cyber-attacks such as France and Germany. As previously
mentioned, France and Germany have been identified as the most digitally restrictive countries in
Europe and also have high numbers of cyber-attacks (ECIPE 2018). While countries like
Denmark are similar to France and Germany in terms of the number of cyber-attacks
experienced, they are not as digitally restrictive. This has provoked the thought that a Member
state’s relationship to the EU may affect their DTRI score.
France and Germany are considered to be super powers within the EU. They are two
highly Europhilic countries, a fact which could potentially contribute to their DTRI score. By
polarizing themselves in the sense that they have significantly more restrictive policies when
compared to other Member States, the digital trade gap widens and creates doubt in the ability
for national digital strategies to coexist within the EU. While the statement mentioned above is
hypothetical, the relationship of a Member state to the EU and strategies towards digitalization
require further exploration. In the process of conducting this analysis, the issue emerges as to
whether the Digital Single Market Strategy is best for Europe. The variations that exist within the
EU are what makes it a structure unlike any other complex political entity and trying to eliminate
those variations potentially undermines the values of the EU. A suggestion for further research
would be to explore alternative options to improve data sharing without compromising the values
upon which Member States build their national strategies.
This paper has explored the explanations for variation in digital trade strategies and
ultimately proposed a new variable to provide clarity on the issue. This paper presented the
hypothesis that increased cyber-attacks result in higher DTRI scores and has tested this
hypothesis through a combination of a qualitative and quantitative methods. The evolution of
cyber-attacks in France and Germany, coupled with the timing of the policy reforms that
occurred in order to respond to these attacks, prompted further testing of this hypothesis on the
remaining EU-28. Through a simple linear regression, it was concluded that there is a
relationship between the two variables of cyber-attacks and DTRI scores but not strong enough
to be considered statistically significant. The results of the analysis encouraged a discussion
suggesting further research in this area and offered potential variables that should be considered
in future developments.
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Appendix
Figure 1. Obtained from: E-Trade for all Europe’s Data Privacy Rules Set New Global
Approach to Consumer Rights.
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Figure 2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: CYBER ATTACKS
Data obtained from: ENISA Report 2018
The United Nations Population Division Database from 2018
EU Countries

Total Population

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
UK

8,766,201
11,562,784
6,988,739
4,140,148
1,198,427
10,630,589
5,775,224
1,303,798
5,561,389
65,480,710
82,438,639
11,124,603
9,655,361
4,847,139
59,216,525
1,911,108
2,864,459
596,992
433,245
17,132,908
38,028,278
10,254,666
19,483,360
5,450,987
2,081,900
46,441,049
10,053,135
66,959,016

Population who
has experienced
cyber-attacks
.18
.20
.08
.14
.14
.17
.24
.17
.15
.29
.23
.11
.14
.17
.17
.16
.13
.20
.17
.27
.16
.15
.18
.09
.13
.35
.20
.26
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Figure 3. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DIGITAL RESTRICTIVENESS
Data obtained from: Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index 2018
The United Nations Population Division Database from 2018
EU Countries

Total Population

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
UK

8,766,201
11,562,784
6,988,739
4,140,148
1,198,427
10,630,589
5,775,224
1,303,798
5,561,389
65,480,710
82,438,639
11,124,603
9,655,361
4,847,139
59,216,525
1,911,108
2,864,459
596,992
433,245
17,132,908
38,028,278
10,254,666
19,483,360
5,450,987
2,081,900
46,441,049
10,053,135
66,959,016

Digital
Restrictiveness
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.36
0.36
0.32
0.46
0.32
0.42
0.51
0.48
0.39
0.32
0.32
0.42
0.32
0.36
0.36
0.36
0.39
0.39
0.32
0.35
0.32
0.36
0.32
0.39
0.38
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Figure 4. Microsoft Excel Regression Analysis
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Figure 5. Obtained from: France Cyber Readiness Assessment (2016)
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